
The “pay as you go” model is why Chicago trashed what was once the world’s greatest integrated streetcar system, why Chicago’s remarkable postwar bus system that replaced the streetcars lost its great overnight and off-peak service, why rapid transit expansion was limited to a couple highway median lines, and why constant fare hikes–coupled with auto-oriented policies–encouraged so many city residents to buy cars.
When state leaders finally relinquished “pay as you go” funding in 1971, with CTA on the verge of bankruptcy, they kept the agency on a short leash, requiring half of its operating budget from fares and suburban RTA oversight. This era, which we live in today, saw additional cuts to service, higher fares, limited expansion, staff shortages, and deferred renovation. The only bright spot was federal funding for capital spending, which kept the city’s trains and buses from slipping into total obsolescence.
Angry riders, advocates, and politicians are once again outraged about the poor state of CTA transit, especially in light of stronger recovery in cities like New York, Seattle, Vancouver, and Toronto (all of which have stronger subsidy models). Every CTA misstep is depicted as further evidence of an unworkable management model that should be replaced with a new governance structure. No revenue without reform is the latest call. This is a delusion.
CTA is a public authority that operates in a competitive capitalist environment. The managers must pay for labor, materials, and security at rates on par with other businesses. Worse, they often have to pay more than the private sector because of additional labor and safety regulations set by state and city governments. When public transit agencies don’t have enough cash, they have to cut product quality, which in transit means less frequent, comprehensive, or reliable service.
Change the structure, and the same capitalist logic remains. Everything well-funded in the United States is considered reasonably good, and the opposite is true. Suppose CTA finally gets the local and state subsidies that it needs to pay its bills with a mayor and governor committed to quality public transit, at long last becoming a well-supported institution. In that case, it will attract talented staff and develop improved services to attract a new generation of riders. Absent that funding, Chicagoland residents should expect a further downward slide, regardless of management or a new consolidated regional entity.
With only days remaining in the Illinois Legislative Session, a broad coalition still has only reforms with no announcements of revenue sources. With no funding confirmed by the end of the session, the CTA will begin planning for cuts and losing operators this summer as they seek jobs instead of waiting for theirs to be cut. Sadly, temporarily filling the $771 million fiscal shortfall will mean more of the same, regardless of a new regional entity. The transformative service levels proposed by the Regional Transportation Authority would cost $1.5 billion but provide collective dividends for the environment, economy, and equity, benefiting riders and non-riders, no magical thinking needed.
Nicholas Dagen Bloom is a professor of urban policy and planning at Hunter College of the City University of New York and author of "The Great American Transit Disaster."
